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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

L:tlNG DIAMOND OIL CORPORATION,
tormerly known as FLYING DIAMOND
c.ul<POAATION, a Utah corporation,
I

PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.
NEWTON SHEEP COMPANY, a limited
RALPH M. NEWTON,
EUGENE B. NEWTON and SCOTT F.
NEWTON, general partners; and
EUGENE B. NEWTON, individually,
and EDNA ELLIOTT NEWTON,
his wife,
~artnership;

Case No. 19178

DefendantsResponden ts.
and
BASS ENTERPRISES PRODUCTION CO.,
a Texas corporation,
Intervenor
DefendantRespondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The owner of a severed oil and gas title covenanted to
pay the surface owner amounts equal to 2 1/2% of the value of
the oil and gas produced from the property, the covenant being
made in consideration of the surface owner's grant of oil and
gas operating easements; the case involves conflicting claims
upon the benefit of the covenant.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER LOURT
The lower court decreed that the defendant-respondent
parties are entitled to spec ific>d fr act ions of the "moneys pa

t,J

heretofore and hereafter" by reason of the covc>nant, and
granted them money judgments against appellant for past
payments made to appellant by the oil and gas owner.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks vacation of the lower court's
judgment, and a remand with directions for entry of a judgment
declaring that appellant holds the entire benefit of the
covenant and its proceeds.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Preliminary Statement
This appeal is taken from the adjudication of one
count of a five-count complaint.

The complaint, filed by

appellant Flying Diamond Oil Corporation ("Flying Diamond")
seeks declaratory relief to construe a contract covering its
purchase of a sheep ranch property from the respondent Newton
parties ("the Newtons").

Respondent Bass Enterprises

Production Company ("Bass")

intervened as to Count I only.

By

agreement of the parties and upon the trial court's order,
Count I was bifurcated and tried separately.
remain pending in the court below.

-2-

The other counts

In Count I Fl;ing Diamond seeks a declaratory judgment
: 01.;t,

notwithstanding the Newtons' contrary demands, Flying

'11amond is -=ntitled to all benefits of a covenant made by
,·hamplin Petroleum Company

("Champlin")

to make payments equal

to 2 1/2% of the value of oil and gas production from certain
sections of the ranch property.

Flying Diamond, the owner of

the surface, claims ownership of the covenant benefits as
successor surface owner in accordance with the terms of the
Surface Owner's Agreement in which the covenant was made.

By

counterclaim and cross-claim, the Newtons and Bass assert
fractional interests in the covenant and the payments by virtue
of royalty conveyances made before Flying Diamond acquired its
surface ownership.
The appeal requires the construction of three
conveyances.

The factual title history is not disputed, and

the summary in this brief refers to the Clerk's record with the
notation "R______

The

sum.~ary

of the trial evidence is

supported by reference to the reporter's transcript, shown
below as "Tr

{Throughout the transcript, the word

"surface" appears as "service"; it is believed that formal
corrections are not necessary as the intention of the speaker
is clear enough from the context).

General Title Chronology
The conveyances requiring construction are the Surface
Owner's Agreement (dated in 1971) which created the 2 1/2%

-3-

covenant interest, a mineral Deed (1972),
Contract (1974).

and a Ranch Purchas,o

Each of these affects the mineral or surface

title to the former Newton Sheep Ranch, a property of about
20,000 acres situated in Summit County.
About half of the Ranch consists of "railroad"
sections.

These, typically, are the odd-numbered sections

which were patented to Union Pacific Railroad Company under the
congressional land grants in aid of railroad construction.

The

history of those railroad sections involved in this case is
that Union Pacific sold the surface to ranchers, retained the
minerals thereunder, and later transferred the oil and gas
title to Champlin,

its oil and gas subsidiary (R 278).

The

even-numbered sections comprising the balance of the Ranch are
the so-called "fee" sections (about 9,300 acres} and in these,
typically, the rancher held both the surface and the mineral
title.
For some years before the execution of the Surface
Owner's Agreement, the surface title to the Ranch was held by
Hyrum J. Newton & Sons Sheep Company (the "Newton Company").
The Newton Company also held the mineral title in the fee
sections.

The severed oil and gas title in the railroad

sections was held by Champlin (R 27B}.

The Surface Owner's

Agreement, executed in September 1971 between the Newton
Company and Champlin, covered six of the railroad sections (R
278-9; Exh. 1 at R 285).

., 4-

Later in 1971 the Newton Company's interest in the
~anch

was transferred to a family limited partnership,

irrellant Newton Sheep Company ("Newton Sheep")

(R 279).

A transaction in February 1972 between Newton Sheep
and Bass resulted in execution of a Deed conveying to Bass one
half of the minerals in the fee lands, and one half of any
royalty to which Newton Sheep was entitled in the railroad
sections (R 279; Exh. 2 at R 293).
In 1974, Flying Diamond bought a major part of the
Ranch from Newton Sheep under the Ranch Purchase Contract (R
279; Exh. 3 at R 298).

As to the portion so acquired, the

Contract granted to Flying Diamond the full surface title,
one-half of any mineral rights still held in the fee lands, and
one-half the royalty owned by Newton Sheep in the railroad
sections.
After Flying Diamond's ranch acquisition, oil and gas
discoveries were made by Champlin within certain of the
railroad sections which are subject to all three coveyances:
the Surface Owner's Agreement, the Newton-Bass Deed, and the
Ranch Purchase Contract (R 279).
Flying Diamond acquired the Ranch surface in 1974,
before any oil discovery, and since the beginning of production
Champlin has remitted to Flying Diamond monthly cash payments
equal to 2 1/2% of oil and gas sales proceeds (R 279) , and
continues to do so.

(Pursuant to agreement among the parties,

Flying Diamond is forwarding three-fourths of the monthly
remittances, as they are received, to be held by an escrow
agent until the case is resolved).
-5-

A summary of the conveyances follows;
Surface Owner's Agreement, dated September 24, 1971.
between the Newton Company, as Land Owner, and Champlin (Exh.
at R 476-83).

By this agreement, the Land Owner grants to

Champlin easements to enter upon the surface, to drill, and to
maintain specified surface "facilities" convenient to
Champlin's oil and gas operations.
covenants (1)

In consideration, Champlin

to make payments in cash equal to 2 1/2% of the

value of oil and gas produced and marketed;

(2) to pay rentals

measured by the agricultural value of such surface as may be
taken up in related unit operations; and (3) to pay for all
damages to the surface and improvements.

The agreement

provides that no other payments shall be due the surface owner.
Section 7 provides that the three payment covenants
are covenants "running with the surface ownership"; that they
shall not be held, or transferred, separately from the surface
ownership; and that the payments will be paid to the person or
persons owning the surface at the time an individual payment
becomes due, and to the subsequent surface owners, upon a title
showing.

Section 8 provides that the surface easements are

appurtenant to the mineral title, and will bind the surface and
all present and future surface owners.

The agreement has an

indefinite term, typical in oil and gas conveyancing:

one year

and so long thereafter as the oil and gas title is committed to
a lease or a unit, or so long as production or operations
continue.

The agreement is assignable, subject, however, to

-6-

rhe Section 7 provisions stating that the payment covenants are
tnseparable from the surface ownership.
The inseparability provisions of Section 7 are quoted
and analyzed in Point I(b) of the Argument below.

A copy of

the Surface Owner's Agreement is included in this brief as
Appendix A.
Deed, dated February 1, 1972, made by Newton Sheep, as
Granter, to Bass, as Grantee (Exh. 2 at R 484-8).

Subparagraph

A.l. of the Deed grants a one-half interest in the oil, gas and
other minerals in specifically described "fee lands" (9,316
acres); Subparagraph A.2., a catch-all clause, grants a like
mineral interest in all of Grantor's fee lands within all
affected townships.

Subparagraph B.l., covering the railroad

sections, conveys to Grantee "

• one-half of the royalty (of

any type) from production of minerals that the Grantor actually
receives or is entitled to receive • • • • from the "Union
Pacific Railroad Company Lands" (10,003 acres).

Other

provisions create for Bass a first right of purchase, a
covenant of further assurances, and a warranty of title.
Newton Sheep also makes two specific warranties concerning the
so-called royalty interest which are discussed below.
A copy of the Deed is included as Appendix B.
The Newton Ranch Purchase Contract, dated April 12,
1974, made between Newton Sheep, as Seller, and Flying Diamond,

as Buyer (Exh. 3 at R 489-520).

By the Contract, Flying

Diamond acquired a warranted "full" surface title, one-half of

-7-

the 011, gas and otner

~1nerals

then

lands, and one-half of the "roy3lt'/
railroad lands to which SellPr is

0wne~

(•)f

by SellQr

anv typ'°I"

entitle~.

the fee

1n

in

t.~P

Newtron Sheep als"

makes the same two specific warranties concerning the royalty
interest as were set out in the Bass Deed.

Proceedings
Before trial, Flying Diamond moved for partial summary
judgment based on the theory that the Surface Owner's Agreement
operates to vest all rights in the 2 1/2% easement payment
covenant in Flying Diamond, as successor surface owner, as a
matter of law.

Bass also made a motion for summary judgment,

its theory being that the Deed's grant to Bass of one-half of
the "royalty (of any type)" in the railroad lands was a grant
of one half of the 2 1/2% covenant interest.

Both motions were

denied.
At trial, over Flying Diamond's objection, Bass and
the Newtons introduced evidence to support their contention
that the "royalty (of any type)" language in the Deed was
intended to operate as a grant to Bass, and a reservation to
Newton Sheep, of one-half each of the 2 1/2% covenant.

William

Collister, a Denver attorney retained by Bass to prepare the
Deed, testified by deposition that subparagraph I.B. was
intended to cover the royalty from production from the Union
Pacific lands

(Deposition of Collister

- p. 22, line 30), royalty meaning,

(R 527), p.

21,

line 25

in his use of the phrase,

"the two and a half percent royalty in the surface owners
8-

J<1ri?~ment.

11

(Deposition, p.

22, lines 24-25); see Tr 89

r tritroduction of Collister deposition at trial}.
~r.

Collister further testified that he felt the words

1f grant in the Deed were sufficient to convey property in Utah

(Deposition, p. 34) and that:

"And my deed paragraph A conveys

minerals and paragraph B conveys royalty.
distinction"

(p. 49, lines 6-7).

And there is a

Asked whether those two basic

kinds of interests (mineral and royalty}

included all kinds,

the witness said "No, there are other things in existence
clearly.

The contractual right to receive monies, you know."

(p. 49, lines 22-24).
With respect to the subject of a claimed estoppel of
Flying Diamond, Scott Newton and Ralph Newton, general partners
of Newton Sheep,

testified that in the discussions preceding

the sale of the Ranch in 1974, they advised Flying Diamond of
Newton Sheep's earlier sale of one-half of the 2 1/2% payable
in the railroad sections (Tr 64, 80) and that, having sold
one-half to Bass, they (Flying Diamond}

"would take a quarter

of what was left of the half, and we would keep a quarter."
(Tr 65)
Without waiving its earlier objection to all extrinsic
evidence, Flying Diamond introduced the deposition testimony of
the Land Manager of Champlin (Robert Lagerstrom}

(Tr 90, R 528)

about the purpose of the Surface Owner's Agreement:
What we told the landowners was what we took to be the
purpose.
It was to obtain their cooperation, to keep
their goodwill, to prevent any disputes which might
arise from uses that someone might consider beyond the
scope of our reservation, and to provide a reasonable
compensation to the landowner for his cooperation.
(Deposition of Lagerstrom, p. 21.)
-9-
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its deed t•' the Ranch,

it so

3nd that Champlin accepted the copy of the

deed as sufficient for purposes of the Surface Owner's
Agreement

(Exh. 10 at R 5231.

clarified

its earlier letter by advising Newton Sheep that

(Plaintift's Exh. 9 at R 521)

On December 21, 1971, Champlin

(emphasis added):

In order to clarify any possible confusion
regarding the statement quoted above from our letter
of December 7th, please be ad·Jised that payment of
2 l/2% of the value of production, if production is
ever obtained, will be made to Newton Sheep Company
onl
as lon as Newton Shee Com an• is the current
an owner.
As indicated in our letter of December 7th and as
recited in Section 7 of the Surface Owner's Agreement,
the covenants of the Surface Owner's Agreement run
with the surface ownership of the described premises.
Therefore, if lands under production which are covered
by this subject agreement was ever conveyed by Newton
Sheep Company, then of course, Chamelin's obligation
to pay the 2 1/2% of the value of each eroduction
would, ueon sufficient notice to Chamelin, transfer to
the new surface owner.
Plaintiff's Exh.

20

(R 524)

shows that, while Bass was

negotiating the Deed transaction with Newton Sheep, Bass was
advised by James Wallace

(Bass's agent'

[Newton Sheep) own the surface they will
form of royalty which figur
(Emphasis added).
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in fa-.ror of the Bass-Newton

are, essentially,

that the conveyancing

'"as to acquire or reserve fractions of

1es

payment:"

ruled

(that being the term used in the Findings

mean the Section 2 payment interest (R 427))

and the

;onclusions are that the conveyances had that legal effect
429).

(R

The court also concluded that Flying Diamond was

~stopped,

and that the Bass-Newton parties were not

(R 429).

Plying Diamond, as directed, submitted an accounting showing
the payments made to it by Champlin.

The court then entered

the Final Judgment, which decrees that the Newtons are entitled
to one-fourth, Bass is entitled to one-half, and Flying Diamond
is entitled to one-fourth "

. of the moneys paid heretofore

and hereafter by Champlin under Section 2 of the Agreement,"
and which grants recovery from Flying Diamond of the respective
fractional portions of the monies paid

(R 460-463).

The

Judgment also contains the court's express determination of
finality required for appeal by Utah R. Civ.

P. 54.

ARGUMENT

Point I.

The 2 1/2% easement payment covenant, and the
payments thereunder, are inseparable from the
surface ownership because the Surface Owner's
Agreement so operates as a matter of law, as
appears from:
(a)

the recitals and legal background;

(b)

the provisions of the Agreement; and

(cl

the applicable rules of law.
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(a)

Recitals and legal background.

The purpose of the Surface Owner's Agreement is best
seen against the background of its formal preliminary recitals
and the general law those recitals invoke.

The recitals are:

that the Newton Company owns the described property subject to
a prior reservation of the minerals by Union Pacific Railroad
Company; that Champlin has succeeded to the ownership of the
oil and gas title; and that Champlin proposes entry upon the
surface by it or its lessee for oil and gas purposes.
This recital of the earlier severance of the mineral
title from the surf ace title invokes the general legal
consequence that severance vests some right of surface use in
the mineral owner, either express or implied.

This Court has

stated the general relationship of the respective rights to be
as follows:
The general rule which is approved by all
jurisdictions that have considered the matter is that
the ownership (or rights of a lessee) of mineral
rights in land is dominant over the rights of the
owner of the fee to the extent reasonably necessary to
extract the minerals therefrom. This dominance is
limited in that the mineral owner may exercise that
right only as reasonably necessary for that purpose
and consistent with allowing the fee owner the
greatest possible use of his property consistent
therewith.
Flying Diamond v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976)
(citations omitted).
Some potential for disagreement between the respective
owners as to what is reasonably necessary is inherent in this
situation, and this subject is treated in a recent, lengthy

-12~

annotation, Oil and Gas - Necessary Use of Surface, 53 A.L.R.3d
16, 16-174.

The introduction states (53 A.L.R.3d at 24):

This annotation deals with some aspects of the
"age-old battle between a surface owner and mineral
owner as to their respective rights" in the surface of
the premises embraced by the mineral lease. Of all
questions that beset the lessee-lessor relationship,
none surpasses that of surface user and the resulting
surface damages: thus, there is a "voluminous
reservoir of law concerning the use of the surface by
a lessee under the terms of an oil and gas lease."
[Citations omitted].
The annotator analyzes many cases deciding whether a
particular surface use by the oil and gas operator is
actionable, as being not reasonably necessary in the
circumstances.

Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509

(Utah 1976), cited above, illustrates the problem and is
discussed in the annotation (p. 4, Pocket Supp. 1982).
A footnote to the annotation (53 A.L.R.3d at 25, n.10)
quotes Brimmer, The Rancher's Subservient Surface Estate, 5
Land and Water L. Rev. 49, 50 (1970), about the practicalities
of the surface-mineral conflict:
The same writer has humorously pointed out that
"if the meadows were wet and now badly rutted, and his
mineral interest is nil anyway, then quicker than can
be muttered 'Application for Temporary Injunction,'
the client will demand the balm of instant legal
redress and damages as an alternative to his itchy
shotgun trigger finger."
The persuasive power of surface occupiers' itchy
trigger fingers may be seen in the fact that they have
been able in many areas to obtain compensation for
surface or "location" damages which they well may not
have had legal right to recover, but which have been
paid by oil and gas producers as a matter of
policy • • • .

-13-

Before the Surface Owner's Ag1eemer1t was entered into,
the relationship of the respective surface rights of the owners
of the mineral and surface estates in the Newton Sheep Ranch
held the potential difficulties discussed in the annotationo
The Agreement was written against that general legal
background.

The testimony of Champlin's veteran land manager

about the general purpose of the Agreement, and the purpose of
the inseparability provisions, quoted above, show that the
practical business objective is to obviate problems of the kind
detailed in the cited annotation, on a continuing basis.
The essence of the Agreement lies in the
inseparability provisions, the exchanged promises of the Newton
Company and Champlin that during the term of the Agreement the
payment covenants will not be separated from the surface
ownership.

If the Newton Company's inseparability promises

could be ignored unilaterally, the relation between the surface
and mineral estates would revert to what it was before the
Agreement was signed.

The Agreement's purpose would be

thwarted.
(b)

The provisions of Surface Owner's Agreement
determine the inseparability of the payment
covenants and the monies payable thereunder
as a matter of law.

The Surface Owner's Agreement provides, as clearly as
language can convey meaning, that the surface payment
covenants, and the proceeds, can not be separated from the
surface ownership.
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Section 7 states the parties' agreement concerning
the covenants to pay the sums provided in Sections 2, 3,
ind

S hereof [i.e., all three payment covenants]" as follows:
Such covenants • • • • shall be covenants running
with the surface ownership";
The covenants • • • • shall not be held
separately [from the surface ownership]---;The covenants • • • • shall not be •
transferred separately [from the surface ownership]";
and
• any sums payable under this Agreement shall be
paid to the person or persons owning the surface of
the described premises as of the date the oil and gas
or associated liquid hydrocarbon production is
marketed;" a "subsequent purchaser of the described
premises" is entitled to the payments upon showing a
chain of title to "such ownership."
(Emphasis added).
Apart from this language, other specially drafted

provisions reinforce the agreed inseparability.
(1)

These are:

The successors-and-assigns provision.

Section 10

permits either party to assign the agreement; its benefits and
burdens extend to successors and assigns.

This standard

provision, however, is here expressly agreed to be "[s]ubject
to the provisions of Section 7."
Section 7 states the inseparability provisions.

The

surface ownership and the covenants thus are transferrable, but
only simultaneously and only to the same successor owner.
Section 10 also precludes the separated transfer the
Bass-Newton parties say they attempted.
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(2)

Identical handling o[ all payment covenants.

Section 7 accords identical attributes to all tr1e easement
payment covenants

(the 2 1/2% payment; the acteage rental;

the damage payments):

an<i

in the same terms, all are agreed to be

inseparable from the surface title.
The inherent content of the covenant to reimburse
damages to the Ranch surface is such that that covenant could
not be transferred to another ranch property without destroying
its meaning, nor could it with any logic be transferred in
gross.

The covenant to pay acreage rents is, in the same way,

inseparable from this Ranch surface; to attempt to move it to
another property would deprive it of any content, nor could it
well be transferred in gross.

The fact that the 2 1/2%

covenant is treated in the same terms as the other two
covenants shows the original parties' recognition that that
covenant is also by its nature inseparable from this Ranch
surface so long as the Agreement endures.
(3)

Reciprocal nature of exchanged covenants.

The

easement benefits granted by Sec. 1 are for Champlin's use in
connection with its oil and gas estate, and they continue for
the benefit of successor owners of the oil and gas estate

(Sec.

8); the easement burdens encumber the surface in the hands of
"present and future owners" of the surface {Sec. 8).

Being

appurtenances to this oil and gas title, Champlin could not
unilaterally deed the easement title to the owner of another
mineral section, nor could it use the easements in operations
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~pon

other mineral sections of its own.

The easement benefits

""J burdens are inseparable from the described property for the
J

imited life of this oil and gas project, and it is inherent in

this pattern that the compensating payments are likewise tied
to the described property for the life of the project.
( 4)

Match of surface payments to surface burdens.

Each of the easement payment covenants is so written that the
amount of each recurring payment is adjustable, according to
the degree of burden compensated:

the acreage rental

adjustment takes account of the area occupied and its ranching
value; the surface damage payments match the damage caused; the
2 1/2% payment automatically varies in direct proportion with
the intensity of production and marketing.

This

self-adjustment also operates in respect to timing, so that the
separate remittances are payable when the particular easement
burden is felt.

Finally, the right to the individual payments

is vested by the Agreement in the person affected by the
impacts of the easements, the surface owner at the time.

This

fundamentally fair matching of payment to burden underlies the
economic sense of the Agreement and explains why it precludes
the alienation of severed fractions of the easement payment
covenant.
(c)

Applicable rules of real property law and
contract law.

The initial theory of Bass and the Newtons was that
the royalty described in the Deed was the 2 1/2% easement
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payment interest.

The real property theory was Late>r

disclaimed in favor of the theory that the case involves only a
contractual assignment of monies paid and to he paid by
Champlin.

The course of this shift of position is detailed

1r,

Point V.
Flying Diamond submits that the 2 l/2% easement
payment covenant is, as the parties who created it called it, a
"covenant running with the surface ownership," and that
questions concerning its incidents are governed by real
property law and not contract law.

In the event, here, the

rules of both bodies of law lead to the same result.
This brief analyzes the legal nature of the 2 1/2%
easement payment covenant, and the transferability of the
covenant and its proceeds, in terms of real property law and
also the rules of assignment developed in the law of contracts.
(1) Real Property Principles.
The Surface Owner's Agreement provides (Section 7)
that all of the payment covenants are "covenants running with
the surface ownership."
A basic textbook, 5 R. Powell, The Law of Real
Property, 'II 673 [l], pp. 60-35 to 60-38 (1981)

(footnotes

omitted), states with respect to the running of covenants:
[l)
Generally. Covenants are either personal,
that is they are enforceable only by the original
covenantee, or they "run with the land." The
difference hinges upon whether the original
covenanting parties' respective rights or duties can
devolve upon their successors. The covenantee's
rights are known as the "benefit" while the
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coven3n~or's duties are known as the "burden."
When
certain requirements are met, the benefit or the
burden runs with the land to the covanantee's or the
covenanter's successors.

The concept of covenants running with the land
evolved from two separate lines of cases. The first
line of cases began with the decision of an English
court in Spencer's Case, where the plaintiff
unsuccessfully brought suit at law to recover damages
for breach of covenant. This line of cases thus
concerns the running of covenants at law, or so-called
"real covenants." Another English decision, in 1848,
Tulk v. Moxhay, enjoined the breach of a covenant in
equity, beginning a line of cases dealing with the
running of covenants in equity, referred to in this
Treatise as "equitable restrictions."
Different requirements have developed for the
running of real covenants and the running of equitable
restrictions.
The elements most often said to be
required for covenants to run at law are that:
(1)
the covenant "touch and concern" the land; (2) the
original covenanting parties intend the covenant to
run; and (3) there be some form of privity of estate.
A fourth requirement, that the covenant be in writing,
is also sometimes mentioned.
For covenants to run in
equity, courts require that:
(1) the covenant "touch
and concern" the land; (2) the original covenanting
parties intend the covenant to run; and (3) the
successor to the burden have "notice" of the
covenant.
Powell also shows that a running covenant is an
interest in land, for Statute of Frauds purposes.
pp,

(Id. 11 671,

60-14 to 60-15).

The rule recognized in the general law of contracts is
that if a covenant runs with land and is not merely personal,
it is to be construed and enforced in accordance with rules of
real property law.

The principles of contract law do not

necessarily apply.

Restatement of Contracts, Second, S

316(2) (1981).

Comment b. to S 316 of the Contracts Restatement

explains:
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The law relating to covenants in conveyances and
leases of land grew up as a part of the law of real
property and is left to the Restatement, Second, of
Property.
All elements mentioned by Powell as being required tor
the running of the benefit of the 2 1/2% covenant, both at law
and in equity ("touch and concern," intent, privity, notice)
appear in the present case:
"Touch and concern."

Powell states

(Id. 11 673 [2] [a],

pp. 60-40 to 60-41) (footnotes omitted):
The rule that a covenant cannot run with the land
at law or in equity if it is only indirectly related
to the land was derived from dicta in Spencer's Case.
Known as the "touch and concern" requirement, the rule
retains force today, although it has been greatly
relaxed. The touch and concern requirement is the
only essential for the running of covenants which
focuses on an objective analysis of the contents of
the covenant itself rather than the intentions of and
relationships between the parties.
The majority of courts and writers now accept the
test for the "touching and concerning of covenants"
proposed by Dean Harry Bigelow, an eminent authority
on the subject of covenants.
Dean Bigelow said that
if the covenantor's legal interest in land is rendered
less valuable by the covenant's performance, then the
burden of the covenant satisfies the requirement that
the covenant touch and concern land.
If, on the other
hand, the covenantee's legal interest in land is
rendered more valuable by the covenant's performance,
then the benefit of the covenant satisfies the
requirement that the covenant touch and concern land.
[Footnotes omitted] •
The textbook cites as examples of running real
covenants "payments for the use of an easement." Id.
[2) [a), pp. 60-89 to 60-90.

That is this case.

~

675

Powell's

analysis shows (Id. 1f 675 [2) [al, pp. 60-89 to 60-92)

that an

affirmative covenant to pay meets the "touch and concern" test
where the underlying purpose is benefit to covenanter's own
-20-

land.

Here, the exchange of easement for covenanted payments

clearly benefits

(and burdens) each affected estate.

Touch and

'nncern inheres directly in each estate in the land, and is not
merely collateral.
Intent element.

The parties to the Surface Owner's

Agreement expressly stated that the 2 1/2% payment covenant
would run with the surface ownership and this, according to
Powell

(Id. 11 673 [2] [b], p. 60-51), "should normally be

decisive" as to the intent element.
Privity.

Various kinds of privity have been required

in the cases for the running of a covenant benefit ("mutual" simultaneous inter es ts in same land; "horizontal" - connected
with a conveyance; and "vertical" - succession to affected
estate).

These are discussed at length by Powell.

673 [2] [c], pp. 60-57 to 60-68.

Id.'

It is clear for present

purposes that the grant of the appurtenant surface easement in
exchange for the covenanted payments, and Flying Diamond's
succession in title to the covenantee's surface estate, create
such privity as is sufficient to meet any and all of the tests.
Notice.

The recordation of the Surface Owner's

Agreement satisfies the notice requirement.
The consequence of the determination that the 2 1/2%
covenant benefit runs with the surface ownership is that when
the estate with which it runs is later conveyed (here, the
surface grant to Flying Diamond) the benefit necessarily passes
as a part of the estate conveyed.
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Real covenants are sometimes enc:ounter<>d in
gas conveyancing.

oi J

arid

The surface covenants involved here are,

in

their nature, similar to the standard "free qas" covenant
(lessee's promise that the surface owner shall have gas,

it

available, at his residence on the property, without cost),
The free-gas covenant has consistently been held to be a
covenant running with the surface ownership, the benefit of
which accrues automatically to the successor surface owner.
Justice v. Pennzoil Co., 598 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979): Jackson v. Farmer, 225 Kan. 732,
594 P.2d 177 (1979): Patrick v. Allen, 350 S.W.2d 481

(Ky.

1961): Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Huffman, 376 P.2d 599 (Okla.
1962) (by implication); Annot., 79 A.L.R. 496, 502 (1932).
By operation of accepted real property principles, the
grant of the Ranch surface title by Newton Sheep to Flying
Diamond carried with it (by operation of law, as well as by the
express covenant terms)

the benefits of these payment covenants

and the right to enforce them: the grant also divested Newton
Sheep of all such benefits and rights.

The rule is stated in

II American Law of Property, S 9.19 (1952):
While the original covenantee retains the
benefited land, he alone may sue to enforce the
covenant either upon the basis of privity of contract
or upon privity of estate. But when he has
transferred his entire estate in the benefited land,
the benefit has run to the assignee, and the latter
alone can enforce the privity of estate basis of
liability since the original covenantee no longer has
any ownership of the benefited estate. Likewise, the
assignee is also the only one who can enforce the
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privity of contract liability. This ~s on the theory
that the contract right is impliedly assigned with the
benefited land, so as to pass with the benefit to the
assignee.
(2) Principles of Contract Law.
If the problem presented by this case is analyzed in
terms of the rules of contract law, the result is the same as
that stated above.

An assignment of fractional interests in

the 2 1/2% payment interest, or an assignment of the individual
payments accruing from time to time, cannot be given any legal
effect.

The Restatement of Contracts, Second, S 317(2) (1981)

(emphasis added), states:
(2)

A contractual right can be assigned unless

(a) the substitution of a right of the assignee
for the right of the assignor would materially change
the duty of the obliger, or materially increase the
burden of risk imposed on him by his contract, or
materially impair his chance of obtaining return
performance, or materially reduce its value to him, or
(bl
the assignment is forbidden by statute or is
otherwise inoperative on grounds of public policy, or
(c)

assignment is validly precluded by contract.

Both underlined exceptions to S 317(2) are
applicable.
assigned.

No contractual right to the 2 1/2% payment can be
Subsection (c) applies because an assignment in

gross of fractions of the covenant, or the recurring money
payments, is precluded by contract provisions which forbid
separate transfer and separate holding, and which vest the
right of payment in the person who owns the surface when the
individual remittance falls due.

Subsection (a) applies

because a diversion of remittances to a stranger to the surface
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title would materially "reduce the value"
Surface Owner's Agreement.

to Champlin of the

The purpose of the Agreement would

be thwarted, as discussed in Point I(a).
The Bass-Newton assignment theory fails for an
additional reason, founded in the language the parties used in
the Deed.

Even if the Deed could be read as if it were an

assignment of future remittances, and even if the supposed
assignment were not otherwise precluded, the Deed language
would transfer only those payments to which the Grantor is
•entitled" when the payment is due.

The underlying condition

is Newton Sheep's •entitlement• to the remittance, and this
terminated upon its sale of the Ranch surface by operation of
the very instrument creating the remittance obligation.

The

subject of assignment of conditional rights is treated in
Restatement of Contracts, Second, § 320 (1981).

It is there

said that a conditional right can be assigned before the
condition occurs, and that "the assignee's right is subject to
the same conditions as was the assignor's."

Id. Comment c.

Thus, A can validly assign his future wages at X Company, but
if he later resigns his employment the assignee has no claim
upon the wages of X Company's next employee.

The principle

further defeats respondents' alternative theory.
Point II.

Practical construction of the Surf ace
Owner's Agreement by the parties
shows that the 2 1/2% easement payment
covenant is inseparable from the surface
ownership.
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As shown above, the 2 1/2% easement payment covenant
and the accruing payments are as a matter of law inseparable
frDm the surface title.

This point can be validated through

examination of the parties' actions pursuant to the Surface
owner's Agreement.
Some years before production, Champlin accepted Newton
Sheep's showing of its sucession to the surface title and took
some care to advise Newton Sheep that the payments under the
2 1/2% covenant are inseparable from the surface ownership.
(Exh. 9 at R 521).

Later, Champlin accepted Flying Diamond's

proof of its surface ownership.

Champlin began monthly

payments to Flying Diamond, as surface owner, when oil and gas
marketing commenced.

Champlin continued these surface payments

notwithstanding that it was apprised of this suit when
pre-trial discovery involved its personnel, and continues to do
so to the present time.
Flying Diamond, by acts, construed the Agreement
identically.

Before production was obtained, Flying Diamond

advised Champlin of its acquisition of the surface ownership.
Flying Diamond has routinely accepted the 2 1/2% payments as
its own.

Upon the Newton demand to participate, it brought

this action to declare its right to the covenant benefits.
Newton Sheep itself earlier submitted proof of its
acquisition of surface title to Champlin for purposes of the
Surface Owner's Agreement.

(Exhs. 9 at R 521, 10 at R 523).
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Similarly, although Bass and the Newtons now assert
~at

their actions effectively separated the covenant payment

from the surface title, their conduct shows a most practical
recognition of inseparability.
prepared within a

mon~

The Deed, drafted by Bass, was

or two after Newton Sheep had been

fully advised by Champlin about
of Section 7.

in contrast, the purported royalty grant in the

Railroad lands operates only to
•entitled."
recognizes
in

~e

inseparability provisions

The Deed warrants the one-half mineral title in

fee lands;

~e

~e

~e

extent that Newton Sheep is

The quit-claim nature of the second grant
~e

severability problem, then further addresses it

second paragraph of Subparagraph B., which provides:
In addition to ~e specific warranties of
paragraph IV hereof, ~e Grantor, as a real covenant,
specifically covenants ~at the interest conveyed in
~is subparagraph B. constitutes a mutual covenant
running wi~ the land described on Exhibit "B", and
all successive future owners of the interest conveyed
under ~e provisions of this subparagraph B., shall
have ~e right to invoke and enforce its provisions as
~e original signers thereto.

The two covenants Newton Sheep here makes concerning the
fractional royalty it has purportedly severed and conveyed to a
grantee owning no other interest in
that

~e

~e

Railroad lands, are (a)

royalty runs with the Railroad lands, and (b) that it

does not run but is enforceable in gross by all fractional
successor royalty owners.
o~er.

The covenants contradict each

Newton Sheep's breach is built in.

money back if it chooses.
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Bass can have its

Practical construction is • . . • entitled to great, if
not controlling influence" in ascertaining contract meaning.
I 7 Am.

Jur.

2d, Contracts,

§

274 (1964).

The actions of all

lhe parties show recognition, in practice, that the benefit of
the covenant payments is inherent in the surface title.

Point III. The trial court improperly admitted
extrinsic evidence; evidence of the
"intent" of the parties to the Deed is
immaterial because the earlier Surface
Owner's Agreement is without ambiguity and
is dispositive.
Before trial, Flying Diamond submitted a motion for
partial summary judgment based on the theory that the
unambiguous provisions of the Surface Owner's Agreement
determine the case.

This motion was renewed at trial and an

objection was made to the admission of any extrinsic evidence.
These motions were denied and the objection was overruled.

It

is argued in this point that the rulings were erroneous.
The rule in Utah governing deed construction was
stated in Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979)
(footnotes ommitted)

(emphasis in original), as follows:

This Court has long recognized the cardinal rule
of deed construction that the intention of the parties
as drawn from the whole deed must govern.
In the absence of ambiguity, the construction of
deeds is a question of law for the court, and the main
object in construing a deed is to ascertain the
intention of the parties, especially that of the
granter, from the language used. The description of
the property in a deed is prima facie an expression of
the intention of the granter and the term "intention,"
as applied to the construction of a deed, is to be
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distinguished from its usual connotatirin.
When so
applied, it is a term of art and s1gni fies a meanrng
of the writing.
Deeds are to be construed l ikP other wr 1 t ten
instruments, and where a deed is plain and
unambiguous, parol evidence is not admissible to vary
its terms.
It is the court's duty to construe a deed
as it is written, and in the final analysis, each
instrument must be construed in the light of its own
language and peculiar facts.
It is also well known
that the intention of the parties to a conveyance is
open to interpretation only when the words used are
ambiguous.
The same rule is expressed in Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374, 1379
(Utah 1977)

(footnote omitted)

unambiguous.

("The deed is clear and

When the intention of the parties can be

ascertained from the words used in the deed, there remains
nothing to effectuate that intention.&)
It is apparent from a reading of the Surface Owner's
Agreement, and increasingly apparent on re-readings, that the
instrument was prepared with as much care as can be brought to
legal drafting work.

The Agreement is without ambiguity.

Its

provisions operate as a matter of law and require a judgment in
Flying Diamond's favor.
If the Agreement so operates, evidence proferred by
Bass and the Newtons about the subjective intent behind their
later Deed is not material.

It could not matter that they may

have intended an attempt at a transfer of an interest in the
2 1/2% payment covenant because they could not have done so,
Point IV.

The 2 l/2% payment covenant is not a "royalty
(of any type)," and therefore the Deed from
Newton Sheep to Bass did not grant, or reserve,
any interest therein.
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Initially, the case presented by Bass and the Newtons
,as based on the theory that the 2 1/2% easement payment
,ovenant is a royalty, and that the "royalty (of any type)"
Language of the Bass-Newton Deed granted one-half, and reserved
one-half, of the interest.
theory.

The case was briefed on the royalty

A memorandum filed by Bass argues:
A.
The 2 1/2% payment by Champlin is a royalty
and assignable: -- The 2 1/2% share in the production
from oil an gas granted to the Newtons is a
nonparticipating royalty carved out of the oil and gas
estate by the owner (Champlin) in favor of a third
party (the Newtons). This type of royalty is called
"non-participating• because it does not include
participation in bonuses or delay rentals and because
it carries no right to lease or to produce the oil and
gas [citations omitted].
A nonparticipating royalty may be created by
grant, as here, or by reservation either before or
after a mineral lease is issued. The royalty in this
case is a present vested incorporeal interest in the
oil and gas estate and in the production therefrom.
(Memorandum • • • In Support of [Bass's] Motion for
Summary Judgment; R 126-7).
At trial, the Bass-Newton parties sought to prove

intent that the royalty grant conveyed the 2 1/2% payment:
Collister testimony was wholly directed to that point.

the

The

findings and conclusions submitted by the Bass-Newton parties
to the lower court reflects the royalty theory.

The basic

findings recite such an intent and the conclusions are that the
conveyances effected the transfer of "the 2 1/2% payment"
interest (Findings 6, 9; Conclusions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9).
A theoretical difficulty with all this lies in the
premise that the •2 1/2% payment• is a "royalty•:
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if as a

legal matter it is not a

royalti'

(a

tPrrn

r•d'1H•Y

d

technical

meaning) a substantial problem of law is rc.1s"'rl as to whether
the Deed conveyed it.

This may well have prompted the

post-trial disavowal of the royalty theory by tt1e Bass··Newtor•
par ties.
"Royalty• is defined by

Williams~

Meyers (H. Williams

and C< Meyers, Oil and Gas Terms, 656 1:ith ed. 1981)) as
follows:
(1)

The landowner's share of production, free of

expenses of production.
(2)

A share of production, free of expenses of

production, e<g., an overriding Royalty

(q.v.) of 1/8 of

the 7/8 working interest.
The Hornbook

(R. Hemingway, Oil and Gas, S 2.7(C), p.

52 (1971)) states:
In the vast majority of jurisdictions a grant
or reservation of a •royalty" interest will be
interpreted as creating a non-cost bearing interest
that will share only in a fractional portion of gross
production, and will not participate in bonus, delay
rentals, or the power to lease.
In a few jurisdictions, notably Oklahoma, the
term •royalty• is treated as being uncertain in
meaning and circumstances surrounding the transaction
will bear on the supposed intent of the parties.
Generally speaking, a grant of a "royalty" interest at
a time when no lease is in existence will be construed
as denoting a fully participating mineral estate;
however, if a lease is in effect intent will be
construed as indicating an interest that will share
only in gross production.
I t is submitted that a
treatment of the term "royalty• as uncertain in
meaning is unsound.
These standard definitions of "royalty" have it in
common that the term connotes a property interest in the oil
-30-

,nu qas.
'~uurt.

As shown above, Bass itself so argued to the trial
(R 126-7).
Bass's position that the 2 1/2% easement payment

uvenant is a "nonparticipating royalty" which was "carved out"
,,t Champlin's oil and gas estate in favor of the Newtons and is

"a present vested incorporeal interest in the oil and gas
estate," is plainly incorrect.

The 2 1/2% payment is not a

royalty in any standard legal sense.

Moreover, and more

important here, Bass's assertion is flatly contradicted by
Section 4 of the Surface Owner's Agreement:

"Nothing herein

contained shall be construed as • • • a grant to Land Owner of
oil or gas rights or rights in other associated liquid
hydrocarbons."

(R 480; Exh.

1).

Since Newton Sheep, as successor in interest under the
Surface Owner's Agreement, did not own a royalty in the
railroad lands, its quitclaim of a royalty therein to Bass had
no effect.
Point v.

The Final Judgment is erroneous because it is
based on a theory of the case (that the Deed is
an "assignment" of money proceeds) for which
there is no support in the evidence or the
findings and conclusions, and which is contrary
to the Bass-Newton evidence.

As detailed above, the Bass-Newton case was
essentially briefed and tried on the theory that the royalty
grant to Bass conveyed a fractional interest in the 2 1/2%
easen1ent payment covenant.

The record reflects, however, that

in the course of the matter the alternative theory developed
that the Deed is an "assignment" of money proceeds.
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The

opening statement of Bass refers to lhe theory (Tr ':>4).

After

findings and conclusions were entered (based on the royalty
theory), the Bass-Newton parties apparently abandoned their
royalty theory in favor of the assignment theory.
The second position is stated in the Memorandum Of
Bass • • • In Response To Plaintiff's Motions (R 419-20)

~

It appears that plaintiff [Flying Diamond] sees
the case from an entirely different point of view than
do the Newtons and Bass. One would assume from the
plaintiff's argument that this case is concerned with
an effort to sever a property interest from the
surface title, or to sever and transfer fractional
interests in real property, or to assign a covenant,
or to alter the bargain between Champlin and the
Newtons or to assign a contractual right. This case
is none of these things • • •

* * * *
The question before the court is whether
interests in the proceeds of an obligation to pay
money are assignable. Nothing has been offered by
plaintiff to show that a money obligation cannot be
dealt with in such a manner.
The consequence of abandonment of the royalty theory
is that it leaves the Final Judgment without support.
language of the Deed itself does not support it.

The

None of the

trial evidence supports the assignment theory, indeed, to the
extent that the Bass evidence touches the subject matter it
contradicts the assignment theory.
The Deed is not, nor does it purport to be, an
assignment of the monies paid and to be paid by Champlin.

On

its face it is a present conveyance by a grantor to a grantee
of a fractional royalty interest in described lands,
accompanied by such standard real estate elements as a further
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assurances covenant, warranty provisions, and a preferential
right of purchase of minerals and royalty reserved to the
3rantor

(treating them identically).
Bass's trial effort was wholly taken up trying to

prove that the Deed's intent was to convey a fractional royalty
interest.

No witness testified that the Deed was intended to

be an assignment of monies.
Bass's conveyancer testified that he considered the
2 1/2% covenant to be a royalty and that the Deed he prepared
was intended to convey that royalty (Deposition of Collister (R
527), pp. 22, 25, 48, 49), conceding the obvious that
"probably" the royalty grant would operate only upon what the
grantor was entitled to grant (p. 36, lines 4-9).
The testimony of Mr. Collister precludes the new
theory that the Deed can be read as if it were a contractual
assignment of money proceeds.

The witness said he employed

words of grant sufficient to convey property in Utah
(Deposition, p. 34), and that " • • • my deed paragraph A
conveys minerals, and paragraph B conveys royalty" (Deposition,
p" 49, 11. 6-7

[emphasis added]).

He took care to note the

existence of the basic legal distinction between mineral and
royalty (p. 49, 1. 7) then went on to say that other kinds of
interests also exist:

"No, there are

~

things clearly.

The contractual right to receive monies, you know.•

(p. 49,

11. 22-24 (emphasis added)).
The record made by the Bass-Newton parties by their
sole witness thus is that their Deed was intended to convey
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royalty if it could, and that "royally" differs 1n Kind from
"minerals" and from the "contractual rrgnt to rece1ve monies,"
This record is fatal

to the late-adopted-assignment theory.

The Judgment,
thought,

founded as it is on a legal after-

is erroneous because it is unsupported by any evidence

or by the findings and conclusions, and because rt is contrary
to the evidence.
Point VI.

Estoppel by deed, arising out of the Surface
Owner's Agreement, precludes any claim by the
Newtons or Bass to the 2 1/2% easement payment
covenant or the monies accruing thereunder.

The Newtons

(and their privy, Bass) are precluded from

claims upon the benefit of the payment covenants by the bar of
estoppel by deed.
The Surface Owner's Agreement consists essentially of
the Newton Company's grant of the surface easements and,
consideration thereof, Champlin's payment covenants.

in

The

Newton Company agrees that the payment covenants run with, and
are not to be held or transferred separately from,
ownership.

the surface

The Newtons and Bass now claim, to the contrary,

that they have transferred and now hold fractional benefits in
the covenant interest separately from the surface ownership.
Estoppel by deed precludes the second assertion.
is stated in 28 Am. Jur,

The principle

2d, Estoppel And Waiver, § 4 (1966)

(footnotes omitted):
The principle is that when a man has entered into
a solemn engagement by deed, he shall not be permitted
to deny any matter which he has asserted therein, for
a deed is a solemn act to any part of which the law
gives effect as the deliberate admission of the maker;
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to him it stands for truth, and in every situation in
which he may be placed with respect to it, it is true
as to him . . . .
Estoppal by deed is a very important aspect of
the law of estoppel. By reason of the operation of
this doctrine, particularly upon grantors of real
property and upon the passage of after-acquired title
of such grantors, the effect of the doctrine upon
grantees, and the effect and extent of control of
recitals in conveyances as an estoppal upon parties
thereto and their privies, many important and
practical questions affecting the title to real
property are controlled to a large extent • .
Estoppal by deed is particularly appropriate where, as
here, the document is recorded in the land records of the
County:
A person who is examining the record title to
realty should be able to rely on the doctrine of
estoppal by deed, without the necessity of having to
investigate the possibility of a personal obligation
to pay a money debt which might offset the estoppel by
deed.
Id. Moreover, this estoppal operates with special force because
of the Newton Company's declaration in the Surface Owner's
~greement

that all of the payment covenants, including the 2

1/2% payment, are "covenants running with the surface
ownership" of the Ranch:
Estoppels which run with the land and work
thereon are not mere conclusions; they pass estates
and constitute titles, and are muniments of title,
assuring it to the purchaser.
Id. § 8 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
The estoppal precludes any Bass and Newton assertions
of fractional titles in the 2 1/2% covenant interest.

Further,

since equity will not permit a result to be worked indirectly
if that result is directly prohibited, Bass and the Newtons are
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also estopped from claiming an interest rn inclividual money
remittances falling due under the easement payment covenant.
Point VII.

The lower court's Conc1us1on (Ne>. '/) that
"Flying Diamond is estopped to deny that 1t
has only a one-four th interest in the 2 l/2%
payment" is erroneous, 1n that~
(a)

no evidence supports it; and

(b)

the documents provide otherwise.

Conclusion No. 7 reflects acceptance by the lower
court of an estoppel contention advanced in Bass's Trial
Memorandum (R 363-5).

The conclusion is based on Finding No. 9

that it was Flying Diamond's •intent" to acquire "one-fourth"
of the "2 1/2% payment."

The theory of the claimed estoppel is

that when Flying Diamond bought the Ranch surface it also
bought one-half of the "royalty (of any type)" then held by
Newton Sheep; and that by intentionally and knowingly
purchasing a one-fourth interest in the royalty, Flying Diamond
is estopped from claiming a greater interest therein.

Bass

cited Russell v. Texas Co., 238 F. 2d 636 (9th Ciro 1956);
Dillon Inv. Co. v. Kinikin, 172 Kan. 523, 241 P.2d 493 (1952);
and 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 13 (1966).

These

authorities state the generalization that the grantee of a deed
is estopped from accepting the benefits of a transaction while
at the same time inconsistently rejecting the accompanying
burdens.
Since the Bass-Newton parties abandoned any claim upon
the 2 1/2% covenant based on a real property theory of the
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CdSe, an estoppel by deed concept becomes irrelevant.

However,

that may be, no estoppel of Flying Diamond exists here.
The generalization mentioned above has no operation in
this case.

While the grant to Flying Diamond in the Ranch

Purchase Contract was a warranted "full" title to the surface,
it was a mere quitclaim of half the minerals then owned by
Seller in the fee lands and a quitclaim of half of any royalty
Seller "is entitled to receive" in the railroad lands.
There is no inconsistency between the purchase in 1974
of a warranted surface title together with a quit-claim of half
of the Seller's railroad •royalty," if any, and Flying
Diamond's present position that the grant of the surface
incorporated all the burdens and benefits of the surface
covenants and that the "royalty" quitclaim was, like that to
Bass, ineffective.

Flying Diamond's position is simply that

the Ranch Purchase Contract applies in accordance with all of
its terms.
It is settled law that a quitclaim will not give rise
to an estoppel.
(1966).

28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver,

"[A) grantee •

§

9

may deny that any estate or

interest passed to him by a conveyance.•

Id.

§

13.

Further, Finding No. 9, on which the claimed estoppel
rests, is unsupported.

The trial record contains no extrinsic

evidence whatever about Flying Diamond's subjective "intent.•
Only the document itself is in evidence, and the intent stated
there is to acquire half the royalty, if any, that the Seller
can grant.

The failure of the Finding to reflect the
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conditional (quitclaiming) riature of the
critical.

part-Les'

"intent"

Finding No. 9 is necessarily incorrect.

1s

Conclusion

No. 7 is therefore wrong because unsupported,

CONCLUSION
The judgment below should be vacated.

The case should

be remanded with a direction to the court below to enter
judgment in Flying Diamond's favor declaring its ownership of
the benefits of the 2 1/2% payment covenant, and its proceeds,
free of any adverse claim of the Newtons or Bass, and to
proceed with the disposition of the remaining issues of the
litigation.
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Vthc bounc1;~1·ic::; of ri, p2,rtic),pn,_tinc;, pooled, or CCli"1uuni ti;1,cc.l nre.:i.,
! (to l':h).ch incll1sic•11 L.'.1.ncl 0','ncr cxpre::;sly consent;.) <:.ncl tl1ccrc is no
provii;icm fo:r tile p;1y11w:1t of roy<J.lti c:s to Cii.J:.ipJ i.n but ).'c ]"<Jrt:i.cipates
' in the rirc,ciuct ..i.on [1·0!11 tl1c poolc:cl, co1:,;1111r1i t:i.;,,l'cl, OJ' \lit'; t area ar::
a 1:urlt.i.11G jntcrc~;t. 01 ncr, th<.'n the 1..1:0 i'.nd onc··l1::ll' percent (2 l/2~~)
above set forth .slin.11 be a:n))J.iccl to th<>,t pcrccnti'[.'.C of the total
prolluction from such area 1·:llicl1 is al.located to tile clc~:cri\.Jccl
prc1aiscs.
Hilcn proct1,1c'cion of oil f1·01i1 l.:tnd:; unctcr scvcr<Jl surface
O',:nersllips is co;:,;.d.nr;lcrl in on~ central t0,nl~ sctlins for pro.ct.ic'11
opera tine: rc;,::;ons, per .i.ociic j_nrlivi.clual 11cll tc::; Ls 111n.:r be m:'.clc to
cc."9u'c:c 1..hc q1lan'c.,i.tics of CU:71:11inr,lcd oil properly <:.lloce>,\.Jlc to
cilch i1cll, and the t'.;o 2,ncl one-half percent (;'. J/;;~~) pay:11cnt
pro·r.idcd hcrci.n sJ10.ll be p,o.y<:iJlc upon the qu:int.J,1..i.cs ;:,P!'Ortioncd
to c::i.c;h Hell as rcpoi·tccl to CJ1.c:11~1li,n in full se.tisfo.ction of the
obli13ations of Ch;::,1plin unJ.c:c this Sect.ion 2.

- 3 -

Sccu,m j. .'Jl\oulcl the cJc;.c-i:.i.11c-cl iwc1ni[;cf; or o.ny portion
,,t p.n,'>'. tj_111c 'uc r:01111n.LLtcci to :i. uni.tj;.;n.~ion ::i.r·.recmcnt, the
i
, ,,1..01· or 111.J. l. 0pcr: .. tn1· unclc:1· sucl1 O(',l'CC'l1\('l1l. 111;1y C):crc:l,;c the
.,·:,ts ('.l'O.n.~.ccl 11.lHIC'l' 0c:c c.i.C>ll l llc:J'eof dur:i.ll(' t.hc per.i.od c.:nd:i.n;.~
.. :h the :f).ft.i1 coJ.cnc.l:u· year folJ.ci:·;.i.nr, the ·uc.tc of th:'Lf: (l.Gree111cnt.
;cho11t coinren:;11.t:i.on to the Lo.nrl 01-:ncr otl1cr ·Lh.:tn )''":;1nc11t n.s .:t'uove
";roviclcll,. but '1.fter :;2.:i'.d period :i.f ;;uch opc.:r;~tor ~:110.ll inr.tall or .. ·
.::i.ntn.in''.:i.:ciy facili 1.i.cr: otl1c,1· ti1n.n l'ipe or pcile l:i.ne'; upon the
;coC :rj.1i erl :·p1-c1:1:i.:; cs clur .i nc o ny c;,lcnclo.r yea;·, it sll.-i.11 p.:i..Y L.:tnd.
;.:nwr:'Oni,; "DoJ.1:.tl' ( ~:1. 00) pci· .:tcrc f(ll' j.llt~ rtci·cac.<~ 11;.ed cluri:·1r.
'iny' pJ.rt,of tl1at c.-i.lcn<iar yc:ar, if :;ucl1 u:.;e su11,,t:tnt:Ln1.3.y dep;·tve:;
::i;c .Lane\ 01·nic:r of :t,Jie use.: of such acrco.f',C. 'l'l1e D.l.:,t>vc a.hount of
~e DolJ.rtr.(~l.00) per ucrc shall.be subject to up~~rcl rcvisiori
18on ·a :; hO\tinc; by the L.~.ncl 01-:nc,,· tiio. t the· ·land in vol vcd has ·
:i1eretofor.e c<irned and is C2.f>O.blc of ,e<i.l:ninc. .:'.. c;rc.:i.;~er stun per acre.
·IJ[

I

J.

•

'·

~(f·. ''.~~«::

. .

•

, ~-.· · ·.Seet1.on il. ~!otb:in[; r::.::rc:Ln contD.incd Sh<J.11 be constr~ecl
.r.s'n.'covcnant to dr:i.11 by C~1ainplin, its 01.e;ents, lessees, liccnr.ccs,
~ccessors, or assiGnS:· Dr by any operator or' unit operator, or as
a Gntnt ·to .Land 0110::/ ol' o:Ll or e;a:; rie;hts or rie;bts in other
as:;~~in~ed 'liC'.'..:.·.i.c1 hyclroc<i.r'oom;. "·
. :. ,, .
,,_,.,,., 1,l ~,.

J·'{· I \_

, ,·

·

,

· •··

~ ;, ·•· ·: . - '";-•~ ·- •..

.

..:.--:-· -.; Scct:ion 5. Ci10.111;1l.in,. its acent.o:;, lessees, 1.i.ccnr.ees,
sticces:;ors ,' anrl <i.ssign;., j.nclud:Ln[~ the opC'r~to:c or unit operator
un1lcl" a uni t:Lza:U.on acn:cm1~nt, sh:iJ.l be r,::qt1ircd:
(a) to pay
fol'· all' damacc to L.:llid O•:ne:c' s l<~ncls, bu.i.lrl:i.11::.~, .:i.ncl c;ro11).ng crops
· causc.:d by the ercctio:ci (IT construction of f~cilitics to be used in
connection with oil or ens or associn.tcd liqtdd hydrocarbon
,'opcr<i.tions; (b) to bury o.11 pipe l.i.ncs belo1·: plol'I de:Jth \·;here such
.1ine~,cross cultiva~ed lane\; 2.nd (c) to construct Gates or at its·
option 'instnll-c&.t.t.le l'.u.::.rcls 1·1here necesso.ry for cros:;:i.nc; fenced
: land in conncc ti on 1·:ith explor.::. ti on, develop1;:cnt, or produc inc;
opcrat:lons nnd, 1·1l1erc <'11 election h~s been rnaclc.: to construct (',ates
, in lieu of.cattle r;t1.:1.rds, to keep sucll e;<i.tcs in rcpair'and closed.

,
I
'

1

I\

!

•

LI

~

'

'

(
,;:
,;·Section 6. Other th.:tn the pc.yments to be 1~ncle as o.fo1·e[ "said, tl1c Lane\ 01·mcr sho.ll not be enU.tlcd to any other or additionJ.l
paymcn ts .as a result of tbe concluc t of operations upon the described
premises.·; · .

L

I, . "'·.-; ',· -~I,'·!~
.
f: SectJon 7.
-.~

,Sul',ject to tlie provir.i0ns of

S!~CtioQ..-9

i t io, (\('J'CC(l tlli.Jj;_iht__C_QU:l)'\lllr'!-1;0_n.'.1.Y_thc :;u111s P?:OV;i,~1£Lln.
SccUm1:; 2. 3, ;ind 'i llCl"Cl!}' sl1;•,1J,__bc, COY,~!J~llt~ T\~f1JLl..DLL.l:!:~tJ1Jl)e_.

~__(_,

~

o'.mer:;JJi n of the; clc:.c1·ibecl _prc1,d.se:: D.ncl sh.-i.J.l not. be held

OLJ..r:..:ulli.f~..l.LJ;s.u;t ro. Le ly ti1crcfrom ,Ql1(l on~l ::;ti:~~-µn y:JI1 1§~~'J5s!.t·!~

l_hi:; ac;1·c;emc11t slin.ll be po.icl to tlic person or pe!'s~~ oi:·ni!:i_~_!;_h_e
the descriucd pn:rnis~.s .:t!.i of the cL:tt"Cl:he oTI or c;:i.r.

f· ourr.:i.c_e 01 ~
. . ,~·:: ... ':·' i
.

f

:.

_'

.

.

:''

I

<i;'·'.:"_''._!/

I

·,.

,''•I

~.....

:; :·

;·

:;::.t : ' ~ -

Hf)()\(\{13:~

, :·
·~>

.~

;

-. .-.

l~

p[1.:1(:) iJ 0

,: '

·~

.

,,c-.socio.L'·ll J [n 1.1 i..cl h"c1roC<1.r'.Jr1n nruclucl'i..011 i:; 111:'.l'l;ctccl. Champlin
, l l net,: 1101.·cvcT, \Jccoc~c obl.i.[';:1.t.vcl to rnaLC' such p:1.yll\cnt:; to nny
· 'c'lllC.'1t ]'Ul'C'h:.t::Cl' of tilr. clc:;c.;1·:i.1'r;cJ prr.1ni.::;c;:; 0.11<1 ~;\J;1.ll cont:i.nuc
:11;i.ke such po.y1.1cnt:.: to the J.nncl O•::ncr unLD. the~ fi.r:;t. dav of the·
nt11· f.ollo":j_n(; tht: rccc:i.pt, by Ch~c111plin of notice ol' ch.i.nc:c of
:1cr;;hi;1,~;con::;istinc; of the 01·:i..c;:i..n:i.J. or ccrtif:Lccl copies of th0
'r.:;trumcnt' 01· in::;tru1~ct1ts con:;t.).tut:i.nf' a co:. 1plctc cho.:i..n' of t:i.tlc
~~D the' Lan<1 Owner to the p:i.rty clo.iminG such ownership, and then
only. a.~,q,~o;~r<~ym~1.1ts tl1crc.:i.ft~1: _rn.:i.ll.::.
.
.
r,,l,' ':\

~

. 'l

--~~

·

·. ,··. ·:.,section 8. 1'hc l:!.:i.sc;nents, f'iL'.l1tr.:, .:i.nd u,,cs b::rcin sl1:i.11·
be b).nclinc; ·ujlon tl1e clesci·i::icd µi·c1r.ises <i.ncl co.ch r!::i r:.vcry pc.rt
thcr0of ; . an<l the present a.rid fu ~urc 01-merc t.k:rcof. ancl shLi.11 ·
'.continuc· for the benefit of the pi·cDcnt o~· fuLurc O\mcrs of· the
.oil <lncl/or c;o.s. nncl/or n:;cocii1.tc:cl liquid bycl_;·ocnrbon 1·ic;ht.s. in the
. described prc:1,u.scs anrl. co.ch ancl cvr::l·y part tlH;rcof urn! thc:i.r
.~aecnts, lessees, liccn~cc:,, suce:c~s::;o:ts, o.nd D.Sfj)f~nt;, incltHl:i.nr;
.any opg_rat,or or unit o;w!·nt.o;·, e.ncl fci;,.· t11c bq1cfit of othcr l<lnds
11iihin ~i.ny' un:L·i; .:i.rc~a 1·!i1:/1in' i·!h:i.ch t11e der;cr:i..1icd prei:iises, or any
portion· ,therc::llf ma~' -tc ·inc ludcd, - and each nncl every part thereof.

r

J

.

r.'.' ,".

.

'"
... : 1Section 9. 'l'l1is ac;rccm<::nt slrn.11 be in full force and
,c[['Gct from' and e. ftcl' exect1tion o.ncl deli vc,ry ancl shall ce>r1U.nue
·~ full force and eff~ct for n period of one (1) ·ya~r and so
lone; thcrcn.ftcr ac the oil L1.ncl c;il.:.l ric;hi..s in the clc~:;cribecl 1we1a:ises
arc cq:r,mittccl to an oil nnd c;as lc2se oi:: licen:;c or to :i. unitization
acrccmcnt; or so lonr; nc a Hell C<•)1<1.ble of proclucinc; oil or c;;i.s or
.. associated liqui~ hydrocarbons is located upon the dc~cribccl premises,
. or tlr:ilJ.inc; or re;:or};i111'. opr.i·ations nrc bcin::; conch>.ctcd thc1·eon,
·anc1,,,'upon! terrn:i.nat:ion of such lease, license, or m1itizntion ac;1·ce.·ment; Ool\ upon ·nba.ruloruncnt of such 1·1cll, or upon ccs::at).on of sucli
drillin:(. or rc11or:~j.n[_; opcro. tiont>, 1·!l1ichcvcr last occurs, this
·or;rccmcnt sh;::ll tennin.:i. te; provldcd, ho·..1evcr, tho. t. such tcrmin2.tion
. shall nci t11c1· affect nor tcn:1inntc the r:i c;ht~;, c:xprcsscd or impl:i.cd,
·~the 'd0cd or deeds rcfcrrcd to in the Recitals hereof.
·
'i i' • ~
1
·.: \
· ·scction 10.
S~Jject to the provisions of Sections 7
and 9 ·hereof, this ac;rccnicn t sll~ll inure to t\Je bcncfi t of and
ibc binr(inc; u;ion the pnrt:Lcs he1·cto and tllc:ir re spec t.ivc heirs,
·cxc_~~to:L:s," aclministr.:i.tors, succ~ssor:;, and nssic;n!.i.
I

' . .

...

•. ' . \ " .,. :.

'

I •

•

'

..

•

,

c;.1:1.:h.f~
f of tl1c . nbovc-nar.1cd L.i.nd-01::'i1c·r, tioc:; hcrcll:\;_~-11i.:Z,fr-1yJr1iUf.uancl
ln tlic .cxccu t.ion of thr. f0.J,:.'.'·-o' n:: :r;-:rc:ciii'C'n t, hereby rclcar;:i..n~ .:tnd
";·1ivj.n~1~110f.iC:;tcad nnd do·..1cr in and to the lands n'oovc·
I·'·

rI"t";.
:~
1,

I .

"'*-<.-!. :_ .

Ill II m:E SS. l/ llEJll':OJ', tho par'"'

' -~~~?~ ''
·"'.:·· ..

. :....·..

:1 ::
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'""do

ha v'' ex" u t otl t "''

1

--r.:;,-:';

Ll-lC-'(.I.

L:Y.

'·
cctocni, as of 1,l1c day ,,ncl YC<t!' f.i.n;t nl1ovc wr.i.1, Len.
•
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~ow~ 1 .and. to mo porsonafly known t~ bo th~

'. .

.

F

H~R~;i ~ .'

;

I

NE'HON &
]1

so;is

President of
and to bo tho

SHEC:P i:.uf:PANY

.. - - - . ' . · - - - ·

f.su1,s·.:po~~-~~·Hhoso.. no:-:.o ·is .s.ubsc.l'_.~bod to '.;ho forosoing in:;trwr.ont,
r~~~}~.uing by.mo dulys110.rn,.did say that he i:J tho

r .sir;.·~:G~:·.r.nd
!

Prosidcnt ;or snid Gornpc.ny; that tho ocnl a.ffL':od to said instru:r.ont

thc)··~;or~o~~to

is

.w.as

'7of
11

.:io:il of so.id Corporation; and that :;:.id instru:.:ont

:ionled on behalf of s·o.1d

'"'·,~~·

r")ll.

•

·

•

1

facl:nowl~de;od onid-:1.notrumont ·to bo

f, ·d~oa:;·and: tho
I
,

1<If

coi•po 1•at.:~_n.., b:...c. uth:i'.;y

Ho. Doo.i·d of Diro::tor:i; and the so.id'!/?..
c>

/

1

7,z ci·, <:·- .•

his fi•oo 'and voluntary act nnd

froo_ and voluntary·act and dood of said Corpo.-o.tion,

i· by

it vo~ur:.to.rily _oxocutod, foi· tho uoos spocifiod thoroin.

·

· ,. ; . ·. IN \·IITNESS \1'1iEREOF, I hnvo horoun'.;o sot iny hand nnd

t. offl,cio.~:··:;:c:il
' . ..... ., ..

I
f
,.

~.

'.

·: >',:

·,:·.·

tho clay a.nd yos.r o.bovo writ ton.

Corr.ml s :ii 011

• •:~,· t
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u
,, 111.J.-·
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Tbb dHd dated fabtuary 1, 1972, .c
I.

Partie• and Intereat• Con!ey•d.
llEllI'ON SHEEP CDIPAllT,

A Llaited Patturabip
3744 SO\lth '400 "-C
Sale Lau C1c7, llcab 14120,
lleraf.D called tha C:r•tor, iD coaaid•rat1ot1 of clle -

of Ta -

llora

Dou.re,

.1~ hand paidc and other COD91dera~ion. doea bertb7 ~-t. bal'l•iD, Mll, CODYey,

trmu:fet, •••1p and .cl•l1. .r mato1

llASS E!ITEIU'llnli PllODUCTIOlll CO.

1211 Fort Vort:b Kat1onal a-Ir. lu11Al1D&
fort Uordl, Tmcaa,

herein called tha C:rantH, tha interHt• deocril>ed 1D ..,bparaaraph A. of tbiD
pausrapb I, lo 1111bpara1raph I. of thla paracraph I, and la •ubparaaraph c. of
th1• paraaraph 1.
A.

Fee Landa.
1.

AD undhided 1/2 lnterHt lo -d to all of tha oil, IH aod other
.tnarala lo and andar and that -:o be produced froa tha follovtna
daacrlbad land• aituated 1D S.-it Count7, State of Utah, ~-tt:

SEE EXHIBIT .A .. ATTACHED, SICNED FOR l.D£::TITICAno11 AND IlfCORPOllATED
llEREIN BY REFERENCE

·-

tocathar vith the .rtihc of in1reH and '"S"•H at all u ..a for tha
purpoH of oparatin1 and d.,,.lopin1 Nid laoda for oil, aaa and
ocher ainerala, and •arketins cha therafroa vith the rishc to
r...,,• froa aaid landa all of C:rant . . • a properer and impr.,,._ca,
lncludio& cha ralaaae and vat,,... of cha ri&ht of "-•taacl.
Thia c"'"'ayanca ia -d• llUbjacC Co anr ri&hta niactoa co
any laaH• or aaaiana uodar any Yalid and aobabtins oil and &•• •
laaaa of record baratofor• aacutad; it baio& underatood aod asr-•
that add Grant. . ahall have, HCaiYa and anj07 Cha baraio sraotad
andiYidad f.DcarHt lo aod co all -u•••· noca, roralctaa ll1MI
ocher l>aoafica vhicb - r accrue uodar clle ca.... of aaid laaM
lnaofar aa it conra Cha aboYe daacril>ad laDd froa and &fear Cha
dace hereof, pracbelr •• i f cha Graot•• baraf.D ·had l>a• ac clle
dace of tbe . . kin& of aaid luae the ovnar of a aiailar 1111d1"1dad
1atareat iD •Dd to th• land• deacribed and .Grut. . oaa of tbe
l•••Dr• tbereia.
··...· :
·
2.

Subj•ct to the apacific tmr• of parasnpb 11 i.er-f, and escape
for th• land• daocribad in aobpansrapll I. (Exhibit •1• atcacbad),
it ta Cha apacific intent of the Graotor baraio CO CDOYa1 a 1/2
•ioaral ioc ..eat in all lands - • d br th• C:raotor 1D the folliD& covnabipa located lo 5 - i t Couocr, Ocab1
T_.hip
Tovnohip
Townohip
TDWDship

1
2
3
1
TOVftll~ip 2

llorth,
North,
North,
llorth,
llortb,

KaD1•
!Ian&•
Ian&•
la•&•
Ian&•

7
7
7
6
6

Eaac
Eaat
Eaat
Eaat
Eaat

Jc ta apaciflcall1 undaratood chat no iotereat of •"1 type 1D the
landa deacribed in aubparasraph I. bcraof ta CDDYef•d andar tbe
unu of Chia aubparasrapb A.
L-4636

.

PAG£285
-.

- - - - --····-

-···-··-·-- - I
APPENDIX B
I

I.

Onion Pacific: bilroad CO!IJ?any Uind•.·

One-half of the .:0,.alty (of any t:rp•) fro. production of mineral• cbac
the Cr•ntor actually receive•, or 1a entitled to rectift util February l•
2072, fro• the followiq ducribed 1-d•
.
·
S!:E EXHIBIT
llltFERL;ICE.

•an

ATTACHED, SICNDI FOll IDElmne>.nOR AND lllCORPOllATED HEREIN IT

_.....,.u..

·
la addition to tbe epeci!ic
of paraarapb IV lier.of, Che
C:rantor, aa a rul CGY......C, apec1ficall7 c - c a that the intereac ~
in tb18 aubparasrapb I. CDftatitutu a -t...i c - c rmmini vitb tba 1-d
dncrikd on EaJUbit .... , and •ll •accns1'99 future owner• of the 1ateraat
conveyed under th• pr""taiona of Cbia aubparasrapb i., ahall ·ba,,. the· ri;bt .
co 1-ou and eaforc• iu pr""1a1D1U1 aa the .0>:1&1nal aip•ra Ciiento.
.

c.

Preferential light of PurcbaM.

After tba data of ciu. deod, 1a tb• ....,t cbac tba Crntor racebu
and jntenda to accept a "Dona fida offer for tb• purcbaa• of ,,,.,. intareat in
either tha minerala or tba ri&bt to recd... r07alt7 (of ...,. type) _ . . or
acquired by th• Crantor, in tba follovi.D& t-.bip• located in S-1t C-t7,
DtAb,
T-abip
t-abip
t-.hip
t-ahip
T-bip

..

I

I)

j
'

I

'11_1_!_'
'I

: i

\j

llorcb,
Horeb,
!torcb,
Nortb,
llortb,

llana•

It.nee
llana•
lbns•
laqe

7
7
7
6
6

Eaat
Eaat
Eut
Eaat
Eaat,

or any part thereof or interut therein, froai • person .. firm or corpor•cion.
re•d7, able and villina; to purcluiae any interest 1a aitber cba min•rala or
th• ri&ht to racaive royalty (of an7 type) - • d or acquired b7 tb• Crantor,
part thereof or intere•t therein, the Crantor i:=ediately shall pve vritttm
notice th,reof to th• Crantee. includin& in aaid notice the nana and addreaio
of •uch off•ror, the price offered and all other pertinent tera. alMI cnditiona of the offer. Tb• Crantee, for a period of lS daya after tb• receipt
of •aid notice, •hall luiv• tbe prior .,.. preferred ri&ht and option co
purchaa• fr- th• Crantor, en7 inc•rut in dtber the min•rala or "tb• ri&bt
to receive ro7alty (of an7 type) - d or acquired Irr tba Crantor, or tba
part thereof or interest therein, covered Irr aaid offer at th• prtc• and
accordin& to the teru and conditiona apecifiad in aaid offer; prD91ded,
tut, 1f th• Crantee fail• to aerci•• iu aaid richt and option 1'7 1inn1
vrittm node• of it• acceptance vitbin. lS daya after receipt of Che U...e
. .acioned notice, th• Crantor aball accept aaid offer and complete Aid ula
in accordance .qcb aaid offer vitbin 60 daya after the upinotion of aaid
period of 15 da7a; and pr""1d. . , further, tluit if tba Crantor faila to accept
aaid offer or to complete Hid aale vitbin Aid ·period of 60 daya, tbe prferred riaht and optioD of cbe Crat• under this peracrapb aluill 1te conaidered .. revived, and th• Crantor aball not cosplet• aaid sale co . .u
prospective purc.heser unle•• and until a.aid offer a1a1D ha.a Hea preaatU
co tb• Crant . . , ea bareinabov• pr""1ded, _. the CrantH apin baa failed co
elect to purcha. . on th• tenu .,.. condition• of aaid offer. All offer• ac
any time . .de to the Cra:ntor, it• •ucc•••ora, hail'• and ... isu. for tba
purcluiH of ...,. interHt in the mineral• or tbe ri&bt to recd,.• royaltJ
(of eny c:rpe) - - 4 or ec:quirad Irr tba Crancor, or ...,. part thereof or
1ntereat tb•re1n, shall M aubject to all tbe t•raa mld cond1tioaa of th1a
parasrapb ""til .Jauary 1, ZOU, at vbicb ciae tba obliaattona of tbia
P8racrapb ahall c ...a.

,;

II'

1
2
3
l
2

~I

II.

I

Tber• 1a epec1Ucally excepted and r . .en.. fr.,. tbia 1rant, all of tbe
inureat Crantor - . in the coal (and tbe ri&ht to recd,,. r07alt7 of an7 type
from coal production), on eny landa ducribed on Exbibita "A" and "B" attached
bereto~
The Crantor further exc:ept• and reserve• the rl1ht to uplore for or
ain• co•l, and to arant to parties other tb.aD th• C:rantee, lu1e1 cnetin; coal.

tl

.,'

L-4636
(2)

llH•rvedon of Coal.
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Ill.

'

'

I

f,,j

u

:11l

I
1,

il

tj
I

~

d

.i I

·i

l

A.

Crantor relaaoaa the ri&ht of ho.eotood.

I.

Th!lre 1• conaideratiOD fOT thi• deed.

C. Cra~tor as;reea to eaeea:te a~cb further aaau.rancea aa . ., H reqviait•
for tho full and complete ajoyment of tho rilihto herein 1rantod, and l1k-1H
•ar••• that Cran~•• herein 1Ull baTe th•. ri&ht at any t.iae to red•- for aaid
Cran tor &, p.yiaaut, •1 110rtc•c•. ~•• or other li•u • tb• abne described
land, ilpon default in pa,,....t "1 Cran tor, and be oubrocatod to tba rlchta of
the bolder thereof.
•

I

i
ll

Cener•i ..

IV.

. llorranty.

To U.. and co bold th• a...,.. d•~1!»ed propeny vith all ad oinsular the
rishto, pr1"1lo1u and •pin.rt.......,•• tharaunto or in ...,.n.. l>olon1in1 to the uid
"Cra.otee herein, it• heir•, auccaaaora, personal rapreaenutivea, adaia.iatratora,
executor• and aaaipa forn•r, &!Ml C:rantor does hereby varrant uid Utla u
Crantn, it.a heir•, aecutora, adainiatrators, person.al repreantativu, auccuaora
and aH11na for.,,or, and doea honby asrH to defend all and ainsular tb• u1d
property at-;> Ula aaid CrantH herein• it• heir•. auceeeora. uecutora. personal
repreaancaci,,.. and ua11no a1alnat ..,• ..,. peraoo vb-ner clat.iDa or to claia
the • - or 8117 part thereof.
'f.

~-

Notic•• required under the ...... of tbu dead. .ui1 'b• elven to tba pans. .
at tho addroHH ohown in para1rapb 1 hereof.
DATED February 1, 197%.

STATE OF UTAH

)

> ...

COUllTY OF SALT l..u:E)

..

-Oii

On Febl'l!ary 1, 1972, personally appeared l>afore • • . . Iph M.
General Partner for 11..,too ShHp C:O.pan7, a limited partnenhip, that aip.-d tba
above ln•t..-nt, vho duly acknovlad&ed lD • that b
c tad the ne

.,.,

r
I:
(i

[,

I·
1.

1~

, I
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EXHl811 ">." ATTAC11Ell

s1c:1[!l roll lDrnTirtCATIO~ A.~ lNCOllPOIU.TCD IT llETEllENCE

Tovnsliip 1 tlorth, l•n'i~ 7 bat, St.'I

Section
kction

4:
6:

S~°';

S~'IO'!s

Lota 1, 2, 3, 4

Township 2 North, hn115• 7 bit, SU1

Sectioa

4:

S.cUou
Section
Section
Sectiou
Section
S.ctiou
Section
S.ctfop
Section
Sactiou

61
I:
16:
18:
20:
22:
28:
30:
32:
34:

Lot l; SJ,.•°'; Sti.,\"\J'r,; Nt'r.SW't; SEil; EXCEPT 13.4 acre• descrii...I
aa l>e11DD.inc at • point South l,6l4.16 feet and Eaat 1,SOS.11
fHt fr- ~ coruer of u1d Section 4, thellce Soutb 34°17• Eaot
221.2 hot; thHCO lorth aa0 01• East 276.6 fHt; th ... c• Mortb
10°2a• VHt 742.5 feet; t1a... ce llortb 79oza• Vut 291.38 feet;
tbeoce llorth 74°41' V.at.471.79 fHt; thence South 35"22' W.at
Sll. 75 fHt; tb... ce "" a 7030• cane co tba dpt tbrou1h aa
arc of 606. 7 f ...c to "l>e1111Df.Aa.
.
Lota 3, 4, S, 6, 7; """"Wis; ElsSW'c; IEls
ill
.
ill
Lota 1, 2,
4; IWI;
ill
Lota 1, 2, 3, 4; SliNll; Sit
AU
Lou 1, 2, 1; 4• Elf.Ill; Els
ill

"

All

.,.

.

Tovnah1p 3 llorth 1 I.ans• 7 teat, SUI
Sectioa 30: EltSVl
.
Sactfoa 32: 11i,111.1'; ALSO, l>e;1nnins •t th• SE coruer of S~'llll(, tbenc•
Vest 160 rods; thenca South 160 rods; Uezu:a North 45° Eaat
226 rods to placa of l>e1inn1Jl1.
Section 34: ~; S~~Vl; ~; SUlcS~; ~

fl

l

11

1

l

ij
'l
·.'

l

·1

1

\I
[_;

Townohfp l llorth, lanu 6 E.ast. SUI
S.ctioD 2: Lota 1. 2. 3. 4. 5, 6, 7, I, 9, 10, 11, 12;

51-

Tovnahip 2 North, Ian;• 6 East, SUI
Saction 12: i l l
Section 24: !1,t\i; JlllldfE!c; lftli.'l\o4c; S.:'dVl A.";D ALSO a tract coatalaina 57 .67
acraa described aa bccinainc at th• Sis comer of add SoctiDll 24,
thence Nortb 89°26' Vest 0.52 chains; theuce North 18°13' Vest
.. 1.60 chain•; then•• llortb so0 s6' 11. . c 12 chafna; &bane• llorth
2"30' lleat 2.40 chains; thence llortb 26°27' lleat 4.70 chains;
thenca llorth 23°10• V.at l chain•; cb...ce Worth 22°s6' lleat
4.50 cheina; thence Nortb 19°38' lleat 3.10 chains; theuce llortll
30"32' VHt 3.60 cbaiAa; thence llortb 24°23' lleat 11.30 cbaiu;
thence Worth o0 so• llaat 1.40 cbaiu; thellce Worth 43o43• V.at
1.30 choina; thence llortb 39o42• lleat 1 chain; ch-ce llorth
34°3• llut 0. 70 chains; tbeace llortb 56°20' Vest 0.30 cbaina;
tbeaca Worth 32°31 • lleat S.30 chains; tb•nce Worth 31°2' lleat
1.90 chains; thence Worth 3o3• lleat I.SO chains to WE corner
of SVl<ll".llt; thence East 20 chains; thence Sovtb 60 cbaiu to
point of l>•1ianin1.
S.ctiou 36: le;inninc at cha n··coraer of add Section 36, t.,_ce South
alou; th• Sect ton Una 80 cbain• to SE corur of said Section
36; thaace I/eat alone th• Section line ~o the Sii coi:aer of
-1d Section 36; thence Jlorch alon; the S•ctioa 11.D• 20 chd.D•;
thence lortb 77°33' teat 53.40 chains; theaco lortb 28°S2'
teat 10 chains; thence llortb 1°03' Veat 40 chaiu to th• Sectf.oD
Un•; tbeace E.aat aloaa th• Sactioa line 2S.3J cbaiu to
lte;1DD.in1.
1-1t Count7, Utah

Hore or Leaa.

1r4636
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Contaioinc 9316.04 Aer. . ,

General Partner
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EXHIBIT "II" ATTACHED, SICllED FOR IDE:rrlnCATID:> A:m l:ICDRPORATD> gy llFEll.EllCE

,,.

Tovn•hlJ! 2 North,
7: 1.Dts
All
U: All
171 All
19: Lota
21: Lota
27: All
29: Lota
31: Lota
Jlt All

Section

Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
lecUon
Section
Section
. .ctioa

ltanR• 7 Eaot 1 SUI

l, 2, 3, 4; Elsi/ls;

Els

1, 2, 3, •• llPI; Els
1, 2, 3, 4, S; S&\l!Elt; &WI(;

~.""

1, 2, 3; 4, S; SEl:.Wc; Siii:; tlsM; SEil
1, 2, ), 4, s, 6, 7; $lsl1E%;. SEJc,~; 5'sSll!s;

""

Township 3 Rorth 1 ltan;e 7 Eaot, SL'f
Section 19: lei;iDDin& at the Sii corner of SectiOD 19 0 tbenca liortb
aloni; section line 2,640 feet; East 4639. 7 fHt; South
12°3S' lleat 300 fan; South 4D°S3' lleat 393.76 faet SoGth
· 49°28' llut 333.73 hat; South 37°so• WHt 288 faat South
3°48' East 1S4.4 faet; South 13°2S' West 317.0 faac;
South 42o33• lleat.316.0 fHt; South S7°39' WHt.196.6 feet;
· South 2s 0 s9• lleat 26S.3 feet; South 24°St' WHt 192.2 feet;
So11th 26°04' llaat 261.7 feet; South 0006' East 153.21 feet
to South line of Section 19; thcce I/eat 3,114.46 faet to
Section 291
Section 31:
Saction 33:

·. i

r.

''
I
~

J

.

~ ~

..,f.lmiD,.
s-~

Els of Section 31, lus 4S.91 acre•

All

in 2 exceptiona.

To..-nship l North 1 ltange 6 East, SUI
Section 1: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, S, 6, 7, I, 9, _10, il, 12, 13, 14; lllsSElc;

S\llc

Tovnship 2 North, Range 6 Ean, Sl.'f
Section l: Lota l, 2, 3, 4; S's-~i,; Sit
Section 13: aea1nn1.n; 12.4$ cha1~ South 8i0 39' Emi•t of. r.: corner of ·.::;....
Section 13, thenca North 17"42' WHt 40.01 chains. oilorth
40 chains; South ago31 • East 79.S <:Mina; South 80 chains;
•orth 89°39' lleat 66. 7S chains to be&iDDiD&•
•
Section 2S: 132.83 acrH in r.c:I( of Section 2S, 142.1 acres in E's of
Section 2S

'I

Conta1n1na 10,003. 70 Acr.. , Kor• or Lua.

·.I

l

·.

j

l

llEllTO!S !l1IEEP CO!IPA.'f!
A Uait..S Partnttahip

"'·~ m~artnar

l

1

:

..·
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